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The study examines if recent reforms in taxation and labor regulations in several transition and 
developing countries contributed to the observed decline in tax evasion.  It uses the Business 
Environment and Economic Performance Survey, a unified firm survey in 33 countries 
conducted in 1999-2005.  The paper finds a strong positive and statistically significant effect of 
various measures of taxation and regulation on sales underreporting.  
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High taxes and excessive regulation, especially of labor as the most costly input, are two 
very common explanations of tax evasion. Recently many countries implemented major tax and 
labor reforms to improve efficiency and combat widespread tax evasion.  Previous studies of tax 
evasion are often confined to one country or to a cross-section of countries, and thus cannot 
estimate the effect of these policy changes across various institutional environments over time 
(see Andreoni et al., 1998 and Schneider and Enste, 2000 for the review of literature).  This 
paper exploits not only within-country variation but also cross-country and inter-temporal 
variation to test the effect of tax rates and labor regulation on evasion.  It uses the Business 
Environment and Economic Performance Survey (BEEPS), a unified firm survey in 33 countries 
conducted in 1999-2005.  Of these countries, 27 are  low and middle income countries (LMIC), 
mostly former socialist countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and 6 are developed 
countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, and Spain).1  The LMIC 
group is particularly interesting as many of these countries carried out major reforms of their tax 
and regulatory systems during the same period. 
Measure of Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is difficult to quantify, especially in the absence of integral audit programs 
of randomly selected taxpayers, which most of the surveyed countries lack.  It is also very 
unlikely that managers will reveal their true tax evasion activities in response to a direct 
question.  The BEEPS get around these difficulties by asking managers an indirect question; 
“Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, 
what percentage of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business 
                          
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina and its autonomous entity Republika Srpska are not in the estimation sample for the lack 
of external tax data. 
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reports for tax purposes?”  Having the same question asked several times in so many countries 
provides a unique opportunity to examine how certain factors influence changes in tax evasion 
over time and across various institutional environments, controlling for firm and country 
characteristics. 
This measure is not without limitations.  Firstly, it is important to recognize that survey 
questions refer to underreporting of sales by employers in the formal sector only.  Therefore, 
BEEPS does not capture other common modes of tax evasion, including income concealed by 
self-employed and employees, hidden corporate earnings, underground activities of unregistered 
or short-term registered companies, etc.  Secondly, since evasion questions apply to “the typical 
firm in your area of business”, the underlying assumption is that characteristics of the typical 
firm should be broadly consistent with characteristics of a given firm (e.g., in terms of industry, 
firm size, and type of ownership).  
Keeping these limitations in mind, Table 1 shows a considerable drop in sales 
underreporting over time in LMIC.  By 2005, underreporting of sales remains high in LMIC 
relative to six developed countries but evasion is not as high as it used to be in the past.2  Next, 
we examine if recent reforms in taxation and labor regulations in many transition economies 
contributed to this sizeable decline in tax evasion. 
Measures of Taxation and Labor Regulation 
 The measures of corporate taxation and labor regulation are drawn directly from BEEPS 
as well as from several external sources.  The internal BEEPS measures include mostly 
managers’ perceptions on whether tax rates, tax administration, or labor regulation represent an 
obstacle for doing business.  Firm managers were asked “how problematic are these different 
                          
2 The numbers from the 1999 survey should be interpreted cautiously because the answers were given within 8 
categories as opposed to one number in other years. 
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factors for the operation and growth of your business,” on the scale from 1 to 4 (1=no obstacle).  
The BEEPS also asks managers about the share of excess employment due to various 
government restrictions,3 which could be an excellent proxy for the costs of labor regulation.  
Since government restrictions can result in both over-employment and under-employment, the 
employment costs of labor regulation are measured as an absolute percentage deviation of the 
current employment from the optimal level of employment that would be achieved in the absence 
of labor regulation.  
Several tax measures are collected from external data sources, including OECD Tax 
Database, PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide Tax Summaries, IBFD European Tax Handbook, 
EIU Country Commerce, IMF Staff Country Reports; etc.  These measures include the top 
corporate income tax (CIT) rate, the value added tax (VAT) rate, the top personal income tax 
(PIT) rate, and the social security contribution (SSC) rate.  The top CIT rate is the maximum 
legal statutory tax rate that applies to retained earnings of resident non-financial corporations.   
The VAT rate is the standard rate applied to most of the goods and services (exceptions are the 
FY Republic of Macedonia in 1999 and Serbia and Montenegro in 2002, where the general sale 
tax rate is used).  The top PIT rate is a legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to the top 
bracket of the personal income tax schedule.  The SSC rate is the aggregate over different rates 
for various social security contributions from both employers and employees (e.g., for 
unemployment, health, etc.).  Where a progressive rate structure applies, the maximum 
contribution rate is used.  Except for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the external tax data are available 
for all countries and all years. 
                          
3 The full question is “If you could change the number of regular full-time workers your firm currently employs 
without any restrictions (i.e. without seeking permission, making severance payments etc.), what would be your 
optimal level of employment as a percent of your existing workforce?”  The question was not asked in 1999. 
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Table 1 shows a considerable 9 pct point drop in both CIT and PIT rates, a moderate 4 
pct point decrease in the average SSC rate, and a slight 1.5 pct point decline in the average VAT 
rate in LMIC from 1999 to 2005.  While VAT and SSC rates continue to be relatively high, both 
CIT and PIT rates fell significantly below the corresponding rates in developed economies as of 
2004-2005.  By 2005, about a third of all countries in our LMIC sample adopted the flat rate PIT 
while none chose to do so among surveyed developed countries.  These sizeable changes in 
statutory rates are reflected in corresponding changes in managerial perceptions of high taxes.  
Over time, fewer and fewer managers considered high taxes and tax regulation as obstacles for 
doing business.  The average scores of these factors in LMIC are steadily approaching the scores 
in high income countries.  However, the trends in labor regulation are less clear.  The managerial 
assessment score for labor regulation as an obstacle for doing business was first declining and 
then increasing in LMIC, reaching the average score in high income countries.  Yet, the 
employment costs of labor regulation remain higher than the costs in developed economies. 
Findings 
Table 2 reports estimates of tax evasion functions for three different samples: (1) the 
LMIC sample for 2002 and 2005 with country and year fixed effects, using percent of sales 
underreported for tax purposes as dependent variable; (2) the 3-year LMIC sample (adding 1999) 
with country and year fixed effects but limited dependent variable – a dummy variable indicating 
if at least 25% of sales underreported; (3) a cross-section of firms in LMIC and high income 
countries in 2004-2005 using the same dependent variable as in (1).  The FE estimates are 
performed on the sample of 26 countries with repeated surveys.  The estimates suggest that tax 
evasion is more common in smaller, newly created, and privately-owned companies, operating in 
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hotels and restaurants business, and located in less developed economies.  No significant evasion 
effect of firm employment growth is estimated with these data.     
The estimates strongly indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of corporate 
income taxes on tax evasion.  A similar positive effect is found with respect to other objective 
and subjective measures of taxation and labor regulation, as shown in Table 3 (with the 
exception of VAT in two specifications and PIT in one specification).  Interestingly, the 
transition countries that adopted the flat rate PIT experienced a significant decline in tax evasion 
after the tax reform.   
Thus, our empirical analysis provides strong evidence of a positive relationship between 
tax evasion, on one hand, and tax rates and labor regulation, on the other hand.  The costs of 
labor regulation hardly vary over time and, therefore, cannot explain a recent considerable 
decline in tax evasion in many transition economies.  At the same time, lower and less 
progressive tax rates introduced in most of these countries can potentially explain some of the 
recent decline in underreporting of sales in the formal sector.  Yet, a significant share of the 
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Table 1: Summary of Key Variables 
 
 Low and Middle Income Countries  High Income 
 1999-2000 2002 2004-2005  2004-2005 
Tax Evasion      
At least ¼ of sales underreported, %  0.335 0.276 0.187 0.109 
firms (0.472) (0.447) (0.390) (0.312) 
Average % of sales underreported 20.027 17.056 11.304 7.009 
 (25.133) (24.554) (19.435) (11.788) 
Taxes and Regulation     
Top CIT rate, % 29.083 23.577 19.889 26.583 
 (5.838) (6.600) (6.368) (7.586) 
Obstacle – high taxes (1 to 4) 3.451 2.730 2.629 2.365 
 (0.894) (1.104) (1.123) (1.136) 
Obstacle – tax regulation (1 to 4) 2.912 2.505 2.385 2.170 
 (1.064) (1.134) (1.124) (1.111) 
Standard VAT rate, % 20.458 20.077 18.963 16.667 
 (2.160) (1.616) (2.516) (3.448) 
Top PIT rate, % 36.208 29.885 27.259 41.833 
 (7.355) (8.903) (12.643) (3.848) 
Flat PIT rate (dummy) 0.125 0.154 0.333 0.000 
 (0.331) (0.361) (0.471)  
Maximum SSC rate, % 40.024 38.275 35.685 31.708 
 (7.681) (8.679) (9.339) (11.306) 
Employment cost of  … 14.792 14.790 9.847 
labor regulation, %  (25.537) (27.726) (15.526) 
Obstacle – labor regulation (1 to 4) 1.867 1.697 1.813 1.899 
 (0.947) (0.910) (0.957) (1.032) 
Number of countries 24 26 27  6 
 
Notes:  Reported are simple cross-country averages obtained as sample means weighted by 1/nf, where nf is the 
number of firms per country-year.  The trends in unweighted sample means are similar and thus not reported.  
Standard deviations are in parentheses.    
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Table 2:  Tax Evasion Function 
 OLS with FE 2-
Year Panel 




Top CIT rate, % 0.481*** 0.006*** 0.145*** 
 (0.106) (0.001) (0.021) 
Firm age (years) -0.053*** -0.001*** -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.009) 
Foreign-owned (dummy) -3.516*** -0.050*** -2.588*** 
 (0.490) (0.009) (0.452) 
State-owned (dummy) -4.490*** -0.064*** -3.086*** 
 (0.599) (0.010) (0.626) 
Medium-sized (dummy) -3.072*** -0.061*** -2.716*** 
 (0.443) (0.008) (0.407) 
Large-sized (dummy) -4.253*** -0.106*** -3.480*** 
 (0.587) (0.010) (0.510) 
Firm employment growth (3yr) 0.038 0.000 0.045 
 (0.028) (0.000) (0.028) 
Lagged log of GDP per capita -20.214*** -0.221*** -2.208*** 
 (5.386) (0.058) (0.248) 
N(observations/countries) 14537/26 17956/26 13205/33 
R2 0.10 0.09 0.04 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  Each specification also includes industry and year dummies, country’s GDP growth rate and 3-year 
average annual inflation rate.  LPM=linear probability model.   
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Table 3:  The Effect of Alternative Regulation Measures on Tax Evasion 
 OLS with FE  
2-Year Panel 




Obstacle – high taxes 1.650*** 0.031*** 1.399*** 
 (0.167) (0.003) (0.131) 
Obstacle – tax regulation 1.941*** 0.035*** 1.607*** 
 (0.162) (0.003) (0.137) 
Standard VAT rate 1.487*** -0.004 -0.032 
 (0.292) (0.004) (0.042) 
Top PIT rate 0.098** 0.000 0.055*** 
 (0.047) (0.001) (0.015) 
Flat rate PIT reform -6.221*** -0.057*** -0.990** 
 (1.026) (0.015) (0.441) 
Total SSC rate 0.485*** 0.004*** 0.029* 
 (0.106) (0.002) (0.015) 
Employment cost of  0.035*** 0.001*** 0.035*** 
labor regulation (0.007) (0.000) (0.008) 
Obstacle – labor regulation 1.563*** 0.033*** 1.385*** 
 (0.192) (0.003) (0.158) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  Reported are the estimated coefficients on alternative regulation measures in tax evasion functions.  All 
specifications include the same set of variables as in Table 2.   
 
